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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, convictions under the Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)' have been fre-
quently challenged based on the common law doctrine of
merger 2 and the Fifth Amendment protection against double
jeopardy.3 These challenges have generally failed. They illus-
trate that current law does not provide sufficient merger and
double jeopardy protection to a RICO defendant who is facing
prosecution for conduct for which he was previously tried or
that forms the basis for prosecution for multiple offenses.
Underlying these failed challenges is a disturbing sugges-
tion by recent Supreme Court decisions that double jeopardy
no longer imposes constitutional limitations on legislative
power to impose multiple punishments. Instead, the Court has
deferred to legislatures the right to decide what punishments
are constitutionally permissible. However, a recent Supreme
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M. S. Tani, J.D. 1990, University of Puget Sound School of Law.
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988).
2. The common law doctrine of merger applies when a defendant has committed a
crime that includes a lesser defined offense. For instance, robbery is a theft
accomplished with threat or use of force or fear. Thus theft is a lesser included
offense of robbery and merges for purposes of conviction, not merely sentencing and
punishment, into the crime of robbery. United States v. Woodward, 726 F.2d 1320, 1327
(9th Cir. 1983), rev'd in part on other grounds, 469 U.S. 105 (1985); Coates v. State of
Maryland, 436 F. Supp. 226, 230 (D. Md. 1977).
3. "... . nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb .... U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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Court decision, Grady v. Corbin,4 has changed the traditional
double jeopardy analysis, expanding double jeopardy protec-
tion for defendants in cases of subsequent single act criminal
prosecutions. Unfortunately, the United States Courts of
Appeals have split on whether Grady's protection extends to
RICO defendants confronted with multiple prosecutions, and
the Supreme Court did not address whether Grady would
extend to multiple punishments. Only by extending Grady's
double jeopardy protection to RICO and other complex statu-
tory schemes will courts finally afford adequate constitutional
protection for RICO defendants against successive prosecutions
and multiple punishments.
This Article will examine RICO as it has been interpreted
by the United States Courts of Appeals and the Supreme Court
of the United States in an effort to determine the effects that
merger and double jeopardy have had in the past, and should
have in the future, upon RICO prosecutions. Because the doc-
trines of merger and double jeopardy are criminal law princi-
ples, only the criminal aspects of RICO will be examined.
Initially, this Article will explore the purpose and history
of RICO and examine the doctrines of merger and double jeop-
ardy and their application to RICO indictments and convic-
tions. Additionally, the impact of double jeopardy on other
complex statutory schemes will be reviewed both in conjunc-
tion with RICO indictments and as a predictor of possible
RICO double jeopardy analysis. This Article will then focus on
the disturbing trend of the Supreme Court to limit double
jeopardy protection when Congress has approved multiple pun-
ishments and convictions. Finally, this Article will examine
Grady v. Corbin, focusing on its dramatic expansion of double
jeopardy protection and its potential to provide additional con-
stitutional protection for RICO defendants.
II. RICO ACT
The purpose of RICO is to target organized crime. The
legislative history of RICO reveals that in enacting the Organ-
ized Crime Control Act of 1970, of which RICO is a part, Con-
gress found that:
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organ-
ized crime in the United States by strengthening the legal
4. 110 S. Ct. 2084 (1990).
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tools in the evidence gathering process, by establishing new
penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and
new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those
engaged in organized crime.5
This Act further provides that "... the provisions of this
title shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial pur-
poses" and that "[n]othing in this title shall supersede any pro-
vision of Federal ... law imposing criminal penalties ... in
addition to those provided for in this title."6
These provisions have been construed
... to permit, perhaps even to encourage, courts to impose
cumulative sentences for RICO offenses and the underlying
crimes. Cumulative sentences are the "enhanced sanctions"
which Congress deemed necessary to treat the spreading dis-
ease of organized crime. In fact, if cumulative convictions
and sentences were disallowed by courts, Congress' purposes
to eradicate organized crime would be thwarted because the
RICO penalties are in many cases lighter than penalties for
underlying offenses.7
Congressional intent to permit cumulative punishment is by no
means clear, however, and nothing in the legislative history of
RICO expressly indicates a Congressional intent to permit suc-
cessive prosecutions for the same conduct, whether one or
more of the prosecutions are brought under RICO.'
A RICO defendant must commit two predicate acts in
order to be convicted under the RICO act. Section 1961 of
RICO defines key terms and a number of state and federal
crimes that are "predicate acts."' Any two predicate acts
5. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Statement of Findings and Purpose, Pub.
L. No. 91-452, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. (84 Stat. 922-923) 1073.
6. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 § 904, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. (84 Stat. 947) 1104.
7. United States v. Sutton, 700 F.2d 1078, 1081 (6th Cir. 1983). However, in view of
Congressional intent that the criminal forfeiture provision of § 1963 would be the
central weapon in the RICO arsenal against organized crime, this interpretation may
be questionable. See Linda Koenig & Doris Godinez-Taylor, Comment, The Need for
Greater Double Jeopardy and Due Process Safeguards in RICO Criminal and Civil
Actions, 70 CAL. L. REV. 724, 747 (1982).
8. See George C. Thomas III, RICO Prosecutions and the Double Jeopardy!
Multiple Punishment Problem, 78 Nw. U. L. REv. 1359, 1417 (1984); see also Koenig &
Godinez-Taylor, supra note 7, at 746-47.
9. § 1961 provides in part:
As used in this chapter [18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 et seq.]
(1) "racketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat involving murder,
kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene
4 University of Puget Sound Law Review [Vol. 15:1
matter, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable
under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; (B)
any act which is indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18,
United States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery), section 224 (relating to
sports bribery), sections 471, 472, and 473 (relating to counterfeiting), section
659 (relating to theft from interstate shipment) if the act indictable under
section 659 is felonious, section 664 (relating to embezzlement from pension
and welfare funds), sections 891-894 (relating to extortionate credit
transactions), section 1029 (relating to fraud and related activity in connection
with access devices), section 1084 (relating to the transmission of gambling
information), section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to
wire fraud), section 1344 (relating to financial institution fraud), sections 1461-
1465 (relating to obscene matter), section 1503 (relating to obstruction of
justice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal investigations),
section 1511 (relating to the obstruction of State or local law enforcement),
section 1512 (relating to tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant),
section 1513 (relating to retaliating against a witness, victim or an informant),
section 1951 (relating to interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion),
section 1952 (relating to racketeering), section 1953 (relating to interstate
transportation of wagering paraphernalia), section 1954 (relating to unlawful
welfare fund payments), section 1955 (relating to the prohibition of illegal
gambling businesses), section 1956 (relating to the laundering of monetary
instruments), section 1957 (relating to engaging in monetary transactions in
property derived from specified unlawful activity), section 1958 (relating to
use of interstate commerce facilities in the commission of murder-for-hire),
sections 2312 and 2313 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen motor
vehicles), sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen
property), section 2321 (relating to trafficking in certain motor vehicles or
motor vehicle parts), sections 2341-2346 (relating to trafficking in contraband
cigarettes), sections 2421-24 (relating to white slave traffic); (C) any act which
is indictable under title 29, United States Code, section 186 (dealing with
restrictions on payments and loans to labor organizations) or section 501(c)
(relating to embezzlement from union funds); (D) any offense involving fraud
connected with a case under title 11, fraud in the sale of securities, or the
felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or
otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable under any
law of the United States; or (E) any act which is indictable under the
Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act.
(2) "State" means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia,
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, any territory or possession of the United
States, any political subdivision, or any department, agency, or
instrumentality thereof;
(3) "person" includes any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or
beneficial interest in property;
(4) "enterprise" includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association,
or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact
although not a legal entity;
(5) "pattern of racketeering activity" requires at least two acts of racketeering
activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter [enacted
Oct. 15, 1970] and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any
period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering
activity.
18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(1)-(5) (West 1984 & Supp. 1991).
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become a "pattern of racketeering activity." 10 A RICO defend-
ant must have committed at least two of these predicate acts
within 10 years. The defendant must also be guilty of addi-
tional conduct proscribed under § 1962.
RICO creates four separate criminal offenses under § 1962.
Section 1962(a)" prohibits the establishment, acquisition, or
control of illegitimate or legitimate businesses with illegally
derived funds. Illegally derived funds are defined as any
income derived directly or indirectly from a pattern of racke-
teering or any loan sharking activities in which the particular
defendant participated as a principal.'2 Section 1962(b)' 3 pro-
hibits the illegal acquisition, maintenance of an interest in, or
control of any enterprise affecting interstate or foreign com-
merce. Problems of proof have made § 1962(a) prosecutions
extremely rare, and § 1962(b) prosecutions are infrequent.
14
The key provision is § 1962(c),' s which prohibits any
10. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988).
11, § 1962(a) provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived,
directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through
collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a
principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to use
or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of
such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or
operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which
affect, interstate or foreign commerce. A purchase of securities on the open
market for purposes of investment, and without the intention of controlling or
participating in the control of the issuer, or of assisting another to do so, shall
not be unlawful under this subsection if the securities of the issuer held by
the purchaser, the members of his immediate family, and his or their
accomplices in any pattern or [sic] racketeering activity or the collection of an
unlawful debt after such purchase do not amount in the aggregate to one
percent of the outstanding securities of any one class, and do not confer,
either in law or in fact, the power to elect one or more directors of the issuer.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1988).
12. Id.
13. § 1962(b) provides:
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering
activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain,
directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is
engaged in, or the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1988).
14. David E. Morris, Comment, An Introductory Examination of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 15 AKRON L. REV. 771, 775-78 (1982). This
Comment sets forth a concise overview of §§ 1962(a) and (b). Id.
15. § 1962(c) provides:
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of
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employee or person associated with an enterprise from con-
ducting or participating directly or indirectly in the conduct of
the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering or collection
of unlawful debt. The statute defines "racketeering activity"
and "enterprise" broadly; as a result, § 1962(c) encompasses a
wide variety of crimes, including white collar crime. 6
Section 1962(d) x7 provides that a conspiracy to violate
§§ 1962(a), (b), or (c) is a separate substantive offense. The
majority of reported prosecutions have been brought under
§§ 1962(c) and (d); however, the double jeopardy issues raised
by § 1962(c) apply with equal force to §§ 1962(a) and (b). Thus,
discussions of cases prosecuted under § 1962(c) apply equally to
§ 1962(a) and § 1962(b) prosecutions.
Frequently, RICO prosecutions for predicate acts of racke-
teering activity are alleged as separate counts (one act per
count) in the indictment when those predicate acts are them-
selves separate federal crimes. When predicate acts are not
alleged as separate counts, prosecutors use a special verdict to
allow the jury to determine whether the predicate acts alone
were committed.' 8 The latter case does not present merger or
double jeopardy issues because the defendant is not subjected
to multiple prosecutions or punishments. Likewise, prior state
prosecutions for predicate acts that are prosecuted under RICO
do not present double jeopardy issues, regardless of whether
the prior state prosecutions resulted in conviction' 9 or acquit-
tal.' Double jeopardy does not apply because the dual sover-
such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or
collection of unlawful debt.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988).
16. See supra note 9.
17. § 1962 (d) provides, "(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to
violate any of the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section." 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 1962(d) (West Supp. 1991).
18. United States v. Sheeran, 699 F.2d 112, 115-16 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S.
931 (1983); United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1979), cert denied sub
nom. Little v. United States, 445 U.S. 946 (1980).
19. United States v. Russotti, 717 F.2d 27, 30-32 (2nd Cir. 1983), cert denied sub
nom Piccarreto v. United States, 465 U.S. 1022, cert denied sub nom. Marino v. United
States, 465 U.S. 1022 (1984).
20. United States v. Malatesta, 583 F.2d 748, 757 (5th Cir. 1978), modiJied on other
grounds en banc, 590 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 444 U.S. 846 (1979), cert. denied
sub nom. Bertolotti v. United States, 440 U.S. 962 (1979), cert denied sub nom. Dodaro
v. United States, 444 U.S. 846 (1979), cert. denied sub nom. Lynch v. United States, 444
U.S. 846 (1979), cert. denied sub nom. Bertolotti v. United States, 444 U.S. 846 (1979);
United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083, 1086-1089 (3rd Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub
non. Millhouse v. United States, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978), cert. denied sub nom. Sills v.
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eignty doctrine as set forth by the United States Supreme
Court in Abate v. United States,21 precludes any finding of
double jeopardy when successive prosecutions are by different
sovereigns.22 The Abate court recognized that state and federal
governments are separate sovereignties, each deriving its
power from a different source. Therefore, a crime defined by
both sovereignties offends the peace of each sovereignty sepa-
rately and may be punished separately by each.23
Consequently, double jeopardy and merger problems arise
only in the context of (1) prior or simultaneous federal predi-
cate act prosecutions and § 1962(a), (b), and/or (c) RICO prose-
cutions, or (2) successive federal conspiracy prosecutions, at
least one of which is a § 1962(d) RICO conspiracy prosecution.
In a typical RICO case, multiple defendants are charged
with one count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), one count of
violating 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), and multiple "predicate act"
counts. All of these counts are generally charged in one indict-
ment or divided in virtually any fashion between successive
indictments. Typically, the RICO defendants then move to dis-
miss either the § 1962(c) and § 1962(d) counts or the predicate
act counts on the ground of double jeopardy. The substantive
RICO counts and the predicate act counts may be considered to
be the same offense, thereby invoking the constitutional pro-
tection against double jeopardy.'
Although RICO has been viewed purely as a unique kind
of recidivist or penalty enhancement statute,2 the prevalent
view is that RICO is not a recidivist statute2' for the following
reasons: (1) A RICO conviction requires more than the com-
mission of two or more predicate acts; it also requires proof of
United States, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978). See Barry Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 GA. L. REV.
291, 406-408 (1983).
21. 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
22. United States v. Solano, 605 F.2d 1141, 1143 (9th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 444
U.S. 1020 (1980), cert denied sub nom. England v. United States, 444 U.S. 1020 (1980).
The dual sovereignty doctrine not only permits successive state and federal
prosecutions and convictions for the same offense, but also permits two different states
to prosecute and convict for the same crime. Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985).
23. Heath, supra note 22, at 88 (quoting United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382
(1922)).
24. See infra text accompanying note 49.
25. United States v. Starnes, 644 F.2d 673, 677-679 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 454 U.S.
826 (1981), cert. denied sub nom. Roland v. United States, 454 U.S. 826 (1981).
26. United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647, 659 (8th Cir.), cert denied sub nom.
Phillips v. United States, 459 U.S. 1040 (1982), and appeal after remand, 726 F.2d 417
(8th Cir. 1984).
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an association with an enterprise, and (2) the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970 deals with recidivism in a separate title,
Title X (RICO is Title IX).' The Supreme Court has sup-
ported this prevalent view when interpreting the Continuing
Criminal Enterprise (CCE) statute28 (dealing with drug traf-
ficking), a statute very similar in language and intent to RICO.
The Supreme Court found that the CCE statute is not a recidi-
vist statute but a statute creating an offense separate from the
required predicate act offense.'
III. INCLUDED OFFENSES AND MERGER
The doctrine of merger and the concept of included
offenses are closely related to the doctrine of double jeopardy
as applied to RICO prosecutions. At common law, one could
not be convicted of both (1) a principal offense that was a fel-
27. United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1367-68 n.17 (9th Cir. 1980), cert
denied sub nora. Elkins v. United States, 453 U.S. 912 (1981), cerL denied sub nora.
Sutton v. United States, 453 U.S. 912 (1981), cert denied sub norm. Adams v. United
States, 453 U.S. 912 (1981), cert denied sub nom. Cravens v. United States, 453 U.S. 912
(1981), cert denied sub nom. Harris v. United States, 453 U.S. 912 (1981), cert. denied
sub norm. Hensley v. United States, 453 U.S. 912 (1981), cert denied sub norm. Holmes
v. United States, 453 U.S. 912 (1981).
28. 21 U.S.C. § 848 provides in part:
(a) Penalties; forfeiture. Any person who engages in a continuing criminal
enterprise shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be
less than 20 years and which may be up to life imprisonment, to a fine not to
exceed the greater of that authorized in acccordance with the provisions of
Title 18, or $2,000,000 if the defendant is an individual or $5,000,000 if the
defendant is other than an individual, and to the forfeiture prescribed in
section 853 of this title; except that if any person engages in such activity after
one or more prior convictions of him under this section have become final, he
shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be less than 30
years and which may be up to life imprisonment, to a fine not to exceed the
greater of twice the amount authorized in accordance with the provisions of
Title 18, or $4,000,000 if the defendant is an individual or $10,000,000 if the
defendant is other than an individual, and to the forfeiture prescribed in
section 853 of this title.
(c) "Continuing criminal enterprise" defined. For purposes of subsection (a)
of this section, a person is engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise if-
(1) he violates any provision of this subchapter or subchapter II the
punishment for which is a felony, and
(2) such violation is a part of a continuing series of violations of this
subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter-
(A) which are undertaken by such person in concert with five or more other
persons with respect to whom such person occupies a position of organizer, a
supervisory position, or any other position of management, and
(B) from which such person obtains substantial income or resources.
21 U.S.C. § 848(a), (c) (1988).
29. Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 779-86, reh'g denied, 473 U.S. 927 (1985).
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ony and (2) a necessarily included offense that was a misde-
meanor. Under the doctrine of merger, the necessarily
included offense merged into the principal offense for purposes
of conviction.' This distinction between felony and misde-
meanor offenses in merger no longer exists. The doctrine of
merger applies if one offense, even a felony, is necessarily
included in another. However, application of the doctrine is
subject to the intent of the legislature.3
Rule 31(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that "[t]he defendant may be found guilty of an
offense necessarily included in the offense charged.. "
Under Rule 31(c), which merely restated a common law rule,32
a defendant charged in one count with an offense such as rob-
bery is, ipso jure, charged as well with every necessarily
included offense of the principal charge such as theft. This
rule is most clearly applied in cases where an appellate court,
after reviewing a conviction on a charged offense, finds that
the charged offense was not proved but directs the entry of
conviction of an included offense that was proved.3 3
Rule 31(c) speaks in terms of an offense "necessarily
included." At common law, a distinction was made between a
necessarily included offense and a lesser included offense. A
necessarily included offense is always included in the principal
offense, regardless of the facts. For instance, the crime of theft
is necessarily included in the principal offense of robbery. In
contrast, whether an offense is a lesser included offense of the
principal offense is dependent upon the facts of the case. 4 An
30. Purdom v. United States, 249 F.2d 822, 826 (10th Cir. 1957), cert denied, 355
U.S. 913 (1958). For an example of merger in the context of the Continuing Criminal
Enterprise statute, 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988), see United States v. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214,
1246, modfied, 801 F.2d 378 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 919 (1987), cert
denied sub nom. Stewart v. United States, 480 U.S. 919 (1987), cert. denied sub nom.
Junker v. United States, 480 U.S. 919 (1987). In Rosenthal, the Court held that a
conviction for importing cocaine under 21 U.S.C. § 963 merged with a CCE conviction.
31. Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322 (1957); United States v. Cedar, 437 F.2d
1033, 1036 (9th Cir. 1971) (here again the challenge is only to multiple sentencing); 21
AM. JUm. 2D Criminal Law § 21 (1981). The cases speak almost always of merger for
the purposes of punishment, and the defendants apparently only complain of multiple
sentencing (such as in Cedar, 437 F.2d at 1033). Obviously, one would not find
discussion of the multiple conviction problem if merger were held to apply only to
punishment, thereby leaving the multiple convictions unaffected.
32. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 633 (1980).
33. Government of the Virgin Is. v. Josiah, 641 F.2d 1103, 1108 (3rd Cir. 1981);
United States v. Cobb, 558 F.2d 486, 488 (8th Cir. 1977.).
34. Olais-Castro v. United States, 416 F.2d 1155, 1157, 11 A.LR. Fed. 165, 168-69
(9th Cir. 1969); see also Walter W. Jones, Jr., Annotation, What Constitutes Lesser
1991]
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example would be a felony murder statute that recognized sev-
eral different felonies as included within the principal felony
murder offense. To avoid confusion, this Article will use the
term included offense to encompass both necessarily included
offenses and lesser included offenses.
Rule 31(c) does not require charging a principal offense
and each necessarily included offense in separate counts.'
However, the courts have construed such charging to be
proper,' and it usually occurs when uncertainty exists as to
whether an offense is included.3 7 Challenges to this form of
charging usually arise in the context of multiple sentencing
and virtually never in the context of multiple charging.-3 The
absence of challenges to multiple charging is peculiar because
the separate charging of principal and included offenses results
in multiple charging of each included offense. Thus, a defend-
ant is charged once with a necessarily included offense in the
principal charge count and again with the same offense in the
separate included offense count.
RICO is essentially a greater offense statute. RICO con-
templates convicting and sentencing defendants for principal
offenses under § 1962(c) in addition to convicting and sentenc-
ing for predicate offenses under § 1961. The predicate offenses
are necessarily included offenses within the meaning of Rule
31(c). s9 Although legislative intent is dispositive and overrides
Offenses "Necessarily Included" in Offenses Charged, Under Rule 31(c) of Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, 11 A.L.R. FED. 173 (1972).
35. United States v. McCue, 160 F. Supp. 595, 603 (D. Conn. 1958).
36. Gaunt v. United States, 184 F.2d 284, 290 (1st Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
917, reh'g denied, 340 U.S. 939 (1951); Ekberg v. United States, 167 F.2d 380, 385 (1st
Cir. 1948).
37. Rutkowski v. United States, 149 F.2d 481 (6th Cir. 1945); Wilson v. United
States, 149 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1945), cerL denied, 326 U.S. 788 (1946), reh'g denied, 327
U.S. 813 (1946).
38. Miller v. United States, 147 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1945); Costner v. United States,
139 F.2d 429 (4th Cir. 1943); but see United States v. Isaacs, 347 F. Supp. 743, 757 (N.D.
Ill. 1972), where one defendant unsuccessfully sought the inappropriate relief of
having the government elect between two principal offenses and twelve offenses
apparently included in one or the other principal offense. The appropriate relief
would have been a motion to strike the counts containing the twelve included offenses
on the ground that the defendant was already charged with the included offenses in
the principal offenses counts.
39. United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 991-92, reh'g denied, 688 F.2d 852 (11th
Cir. 1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1170, cert denied sub nom. Treasure Isle, Inc. v.
United States, 459 U.S. 1183 (1983). The test to determine what is an included offense
is discussed infra: the reversal of the convictions on predicate counts requires reversal
of the conviction on the § 1962(b) count, as well as the conviction on the § 1962(d)
count. United States v. Brown, 583 F.2d 659, 669 (3rd Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
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the application of the doctrine of merger in RICO cases,' the
question of included offenses raises the issue of double
jeopardy.
41
IV. THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE OF THE
FiFrH AMENDMENT
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment pro-
vides that no person shall be "subject for the same offense to
be twice put in jeopardy of life and limb."'
The Supreme Court has recognized that the underlying
idea behind the Double Jeopardy Clause, deeply ingrained in
Anglo-American Jurisprudence, is that
... the State with its resources and power should not be
allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual
for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrass-
ment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhanc-
ing the possibility that even though innocent he may be
found guilty.
43
The Double Jeopardy Clause provides three prong protec-
tion against: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense
after acquittal, (2) a second prosecution for the same offense
after conviction, and (3) multiple punishments for the same
offense." The collateral estoppel issue of double jeopardy may
also act as a bar to the introduction of evidence at a subsequent
909 (1979), cert denied sub noa. Greenblatt v. U.S., 440 U.S. 909 (1979), reht' denied,
441 U.S. 917 (1979). As previously noted, the rule would be the same if the RICO
count were brought under § 1962(a) or (c). See Linda Koenig & Doris Godinez-Taylor,
Note, The Need for Greater Double Jeopardy and Due Process Safeguards in RICO
Criminal and Civil Actions, 70 CAL. L. REv. 724, 744-46 (1982).
40. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
41. Many commentators have recognized this double jeopardy issue. See George C.
Thomas III, RICO Prosecutions and the Double Jeopardy/Multiple Punishment
Problem, 78 Nw. U. L. REv. 1359 (1984); Gary E. Becker, Multiple Prosecutions and
Punishment Under RICO A Chip off the Old "Blockburger," 52 U. CIN. L. REv. 467,
469 (1983); Barry Tarlow, RICO: The New Darling in the Prosecutor's Nursery, 49
FORDHAM L. REV. 165, 263 (1980). But see Barry Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 GA. L.
REv. 291, 401-06 (1983), where the author concluded that double jeopardy protection is
far more limited where the predicate and principal offenses are tried simultaneously
instead of successively. As we shall see, that should not be true.
42. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
43. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
44. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969). For a general discussion of
double jeopardy, see Ernest H. Schopler, Annotation, Supreme Court's Views of Fifth
Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause Pertinent to or Applied in Federal Criminal
Cases, 50 L.Ed.2d 830 (1978).
1991]
12 University of Puget Sound Law Review [
trial.4 5
The United States Supreme Court in Blockburger v.
United States' set forth the basic test for double jeopardy
analysis: "The applicable rule is that where the same act or
transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory pro-
visions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are
two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires
proof of a fact which the other does not ....
In the case of included offenses, application of the Block-
burger test clearly establishes only one offense. The included
offense does not require proof of a fact not contained in the
principal offense. Under Blockburger, greater and included
offenses are considered to be the same offense. Accordingly,
prosecution for an included offense following prosecution for
the greater offense," or prosecution for a greater offense fol-
lowing prosecution for an included offense,49 would be barred
by double jeopardy.
V. DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND RICO
A. The Blockburger Test
A straightforward application of the Blockburger test to
RICO counts and separate predicate act counts would bar mul-
tiple prosecutions of RICO. A RICO violation is a greater
offense with the minimum requirement of two predicate acts
as the lesser included offense. However, two different situa-
tions must be distinguished: prosecutions of defendants under,
first, § 1962(a), (b) and/or (c) counts and predicate act counts
cases and, second, RICO counts and non-predicate act counts
arising out of the same transaction (although nothing prevents
these latter counts from being alleged as RICO predicate act
counts). The federal courts of appeals have inconsistently
applied the Blockburger test in RICO cases, reflecting the
uncertainty of its proper application to a complex statutory
scheme.5o
45. See Tarlow, supra note 20, at 414-16. This aspect of double jeopardy is beyond
the scope of this Article.
46. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
47. Id. at 304 (emphasis supplied).
48. Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1977); Payne v. Virginia, 468 U.S. 1062, rehg
denied, 468 U.S. 1250 (1984).
49. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
50. Some courts have called the Blockburger test the "same evidence test." This
label is erroneous because the Blockburger test has nothing to do with the evidence
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The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Rone5 1 perceived a
potential double jeopardy issue in a RICO prosecution. In that
case, the defendant was charged with a § 1962(c) substantive
count and charged separately with the minimum two predicate
act counts. Under the Blockburger test, the predicate acts were
necessarily included in the § 1962(c) substantive count because
the § 1962(c) count required proof of all the elements of the
two predicate offenses.5 2 Therefore, although the § 1962(c)
count required proof of a fact (criminal enterprise) that the
predicate offenses did not, the predicate offenses did not
require proof of any facts not required by the § 1962(c) count.'
While application of the Blockburger test is seemingly
straightforward, other circuits have found that a predicate act
count in an indictment is not the same offense for double jeop-
ardy purposes as the § 1962(c) substantive count because the
latter count has an element that the predicate act counts do
not have.54 This application of the Blockburger test is clearly
incomplete because only one-half of the test is applied. Such
an application causes an erroneous result, as noted by the
Sixth Circuit.w
The Second Circuit, in United States v. Boylanm applied
the Blockburger test to a § 1962(c) substantive count and a
predicate act count alleging illegal payments by union officials.
The court found different offenses because the same act or
transaction was not proscribed by the two statutes in ques-
tion. 7 The court found that § 1962(c) proscribed a "pattern" of
illegal activities, while the predicate act count proscribed ille-
gal payments. Thus, the court reasoned that the two offenses
implemented different congressional purposes. The court over-
looked the fact that illegal payments are necessarily included
presented at trial, but is concerned solely with the statutory elements of the offenses
charged. Grady v. Corbin, 110 S. Ct. 2084, 2093 n.12 (1990).
51. 598 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1979), cert denied sub nom Little v. United States, 445
U.S. 946 (1980).
52. Id. at 571.
53. However, the court concluded that congressional intent authorizing
cumulative punishment was controlling; therefore, cumulative conviction and
sentencing would not violate the double jeopardy clause. Id. at 571-72.
54. United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1030 (4th Cir. 1980), cert denied sub
noam. Castagna v. United States, 449 U.S. 830 (1980), cert denied sub nom. Berg v.
United States, 449 U.S. 919 (1980); United States v. Peacock, 654 F.2d 339, 349 (5th Cir.
1981), on rehg, 686 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 464 U.S. 965 (1983).
55. United States v. Sutton, 700 F.2d 1078, 1081 n.2 (6th Cir. 1983).
56. 620 F.2d 359 (2d Cir. 1980), cert denied, 449 U.S. 833 (1981).
57. Id. at 361.
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in the illegal activities. The Ninth Circuit subsequently denied
a similar double jeopardy challenge on the authority of this
Second Circuit case.'
The Seventh Circuit in United States v. Aleman 5 9 came to
the same conclusion as the Second Circuit without mentioning
the Blockburger test.' The defendants were charged with a
§ 1962(c) substantive count, a § 1962(d) conspiracy count, and a
predicate act count. However, the court overlooked the fact
that the predicate act was an included offense of the substan-
tive § 1962(c) violation.61 As a result of this oversight, the
court erroneously compared each count to the other counts and
concluded that no "multiplicity" problem was presented! 2
In these cases, the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Cir-
cuits were struggling to give effect to the perceived legislative
intent behind RICO to permit multiple convictions and punish-
ments. In doing so, however, the courts ignored or emascu-
lated the Blockburger test. These judicial efforts to avoid the
preclusive effect of the Blockburger test were in fact unneces-
sary in light of the recent Supreme Court trend expanding leg-
islative authority to override double jeopardy protection."
In Whalen v. United States,' the Supreme Court held that
the Blockburger test is only a rule of statutory construction
that must give way in the face of clear legislative intent.' This
view that the legislature may override the Double Jeopardy
Clause departs from the usual rule that the Constitution can-
not be altered by ordinary legislative enactment and is quite
recent in origin.
Following the direction of the Supreme Court, numerous
courts have refused to apply the Blockburger test to double
jeopardy claims in simultaneous prosecutions of § 1962(c) sub-
stantive counts and separate predicate act counts. These courts
58. United States v. DeRosa, 670 F.2d 889, 895 (9th Cir. 1982), cert denied sub
nom. Bertman v. United States, 459 U.S. 993 (1982), cert denied sub nom. DeSantis v.
United States, 459 U.S. 1014 (1982).
59. 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980).
60. Id. at 306-07.
61. Id. at 307.
62. Id.
63. See Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 691-92 (1980); Albernaz v. United
States, 450 U.S. 333, 340 (1981); Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366-69 (1983). See also
infra text accompanying notes 142-160.
64. 445 U.S. 684 (1980).
65. Id. at 689 n.3. The defendant, Whalen, was convicted of rape and felony-
murder, the felony being the rape for which he had also been convicted.
66. See infra text accompanying notes 142-160.
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reason clear evidence exists of Congressional intent to author-
ize multiple punishments and convictions. Consequently, these
courts have found no double jeopardy violations."
The Second Circuit, however, did rely on the Blockburger
test in United States v. Biasucci" to find that a § 1962(b)
offense is a different offense from a § 1962(c) offense based on
the same acts or transactions.6 9 Even in cases of successive
RICO prosecutions, where the Blockburger test is not applied,
the double jeopardy issue remains. The test then appears to be
whether the RICO offense, "in a literal sense," is the same
offense as one or more of its predicate acts.70  This test pro-
vides little comfort to RICO defendants because a RICO
offense is not literally the same offense as one of its predicate
acts.7'
Courts also apply the Blockburger test in RICO prosecu-
tions when RICO substantive or conspiracy counts and non-
predicate act counts are charged.72 The prosecution of the
nonpredicate act counts usually precedes the RICO counts
prosecution and results in separate indictments. In such situa-
tions, courts apply the Blockburger test and compare the ele-
ments of the two counts.73 In an abstract comparison, the
statutory elements of the offense determine if the offenses are
the same, not the evidence or specific facts of the individual
67. United States v. Boffa, 688 F.2d 919, 938 (3rd Cir. 1982), on remand, 557 F.
Supp. 306, aff'd, 723 F.2d 889, cerL denied, 460 U.S. 1022, cerL denied sub nom. Kalmar
v. United States, 460 U.S. 1028, cerL denied, 465 U.S. 1066 (1984); United States v.
Truglio, 731 F.2d 1123, 1129 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 862 (1984); United States v.
Hawkins, 658 F.2d 279, 286-87 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Sutton, 700 F.2d 1078,
1080-81 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. Hampton, 786 F.2d 977, 979-80 (10th Cir. 1986).
68. 786 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1986), cert denied, 479 U.S. 827 (1986), cert denied sub
norn. Capo v. United States, 479 U.S. 827 (1986).
69. Id. at 515-16.
70. United States v. Grayson, 795 F.2d 278, 283 (3rd Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub
norn. Robinson v. United States, 479 U.S. 1054 (1987), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1018 (1987)
(noting as well that the substantive RICO provision is intended to deter racketeering, a
different activity from that at which the predicate provision is directed). In United
States v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1394, 1397-98 (10th Cir. 1990), the court upheld separate
convictions for a RICO conspiracy and a drug conspiracy arising from the same
conduct, relying on Grayson, 795 F.2d at 278, and United States v. Kragnes, 830 F.2d
842 (8th Cir. 1987).
71. Grayson, 795 F.2d at 283.
72. United States v. Boldin, 772 F.2d 719, 726 (11th Cir. 1985), modified on rehg,
779 F.2d 618 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub nom. Crump v. United States, 475 U.S.
1048 (1986), cert denied sub nom. Scarborough v. United States, 475 U.S. 1098 (1986),
cert denied sub nom. Luck v. United States, 475 U.S. 1110 (1986).
73. Boldin, 772 F.2d at 726.
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case.74
Applying this abstract comparison, the Ninth Circuit in
United States v. Solano75 held that because RICO racketeering
activity in the abstract does not necessarily involve drug
related activity, a RICO conspiracy count predicated on drug
related activity is not the same offense as a prior drug conspir-
acy count.76 Therefore, application of the Blockburger test
results in no double jeopardy violation.77 This result may be
the product of the pretrial nature of many double jeopardy
appeals.7" Frequently, the appellate court does not know what
the evidence will show at trial and is unwilling to prejudge the
case in an interlocutory appeal.79 However, the Supreme Court
has also adopted this comparison of statutory elements in the
abstract in determining whether one offense is included under
Rule 31(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.'
This application of the Blockburger test in the abstract is
questionable in the case of a complex statute. Complex stat-
utes permit violation in a number of alternative ways; how-
ever, only one of the alternatives may be in fact charged. The
Supreme Court held in Whalen v. United States"' that when
applying the Blockburger test to a complex statute (felony-
murder by any one of six felonies), one must look at the alter-
native that is in fact charged rather than the entire statute in
the abstract. 2 Whalen had been convicted of rape and felony
murder, the felony being the rape for which he had also been
convicted. However, the majority did not follow its own rule in
Whalen. Instead, the Court reasoned that application of Block-
burger was not necessary in light of the clear congressional
intent to include rape committed in the course of felony-mur-
74. Id. at 726, 727.
75. 605 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 444 U.S. 1020 (1980), cert denied sub
nom England v. United States, 444 U.S. 1020 (1980).
76. Id. at 1145.
77. Id.
78. Pretrial appeals from motions to dismiss for double jeopardy are permitted
under the rule in Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 662 (1977). However, the
Second Circuit has held that where a double jeopardy challenge is only made to a
portion of a RICO count, an Abney appeal will not lie. United States v. Tom, 787 F.2d
65, 67-68 (2d Cir. 1986).
79. United States v. Solano, 605 F.2d 1141, 1144 (9th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 444
U.S. 1020 (1980), cert denied sub nom. England v. United States, 444 U.S. 1020 (1980).
80. Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 716 (1989), rehg denied, 490 U.S. 1076
(1989).
81. 445 U.S. 684 (1980).
82. Id. at 694.
[Vol. 15:1
RICO, Merger, and Double Jeopardy
der as a lesser included offense of the felony murder.83
However, in Illinois v. Vitale," the Supreme Court later
retreated to applying the Blockburger rule to a statute in the
abstract. The Vitale case involved a charge of manslaughter by
automobile. The defendant had previously been convicted for
his failure to reduce speed in the same incident. The Vitale
court reasoned that the manslaughter offense could be proved
by facts other than the failure to reduce speed; thus, the prior
conviction was not a necessarily included offense.' The court
acknowledged the possibility that facts presented at trial may
present double jeopardy concerns if the speeding conviction
was utilized as proof of the manslaughter charge.'
Because § 1962(c) is a complex statute, application of the
Blockburger test in the abstract will often eliminate double
jeopardy protection. The statute allows alternative means of
committing the principal offense that do not encompass the
elements of the lesser offense charged. Thus, applying Block-
burger in the abstract will allow the prosecutor the flexibility
to avoid double jeopardy violations in the case of a complex
statute such as RICO.
B. The Totality of Circumstances Test
Some courts have expressed concern over the ease with
which a prosecutor can evade double jeopardy problems, espe-
cially in conspiracy cases, by selectively choosing among a host
of co-conspirators and multiple overt or proscribed acts.87 By
choosing among different co-conspirators and acts, a prosecutor
can create multiple offenses, which under the Blockburger test
would not be the same offense. In order to prevent such
prosecutorial abuse, some courts have refused to apply the
Blockburger test. 8 Instead, these courts apply a totality of cir-
cumstances test. 9 This test considers: (1) the time of the vari-
ous activities, (2) the identity of the persons involved, (3) the
statutory offense charged in the separate counts or indict-
83. Id. at 694 n.8. This "distinction" escapes this Author as it did the dissent. Id.
at 711-12 n.6 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
84. 447 U.S. 410 (1980).
85. Id. at 419.
86. Id. at 420.
87. See, e.g., United States v. Sinito, 723 F.2d 1250, 1256 (6th Cir. 1983), cert
denied, 469 U.S. 817 (1984).
88. Sinito, 723 F.2d at 1256; United States v. Kienzle, 896 F.2d 326, 328 (8th Cir.
1990).
89. See supra note 88.
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ments, (4) the nature and scope of the activity sought to be
punished, and (5) the places where the activity in question
took place.' This test is applied not only in conspiracy cases
but also in cases where the defendant claims that the two dif-
ferent § 1962(c) counts charged are the same offense.9
In a non-RICO conspiracy case, however, the Supreme
Court in Albernaz v. United States9 2 chose to apply the Block-
burger test rather than the totality of circumstances test to a
double jeopardy claim. The defendants had been convicted of
both conspiracy to import marijuana and conspiracy to dis-
tribute marijuana when in fact, they had engaged in only one
conspiracy to both import and distribute marijuana. Applying
the Blockburger test, the Supreme Court noted that the two
conspiracy statutes in question were directed toward different
evils; as a result, the Court found separate offenses.93 Prior to
this decision some authorities had argued that it was not per-
missible to charge multiple conspiracies merely because one
agreement contemplates the violation of several statutes.
94
The Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Watchmaker
95
interpreted Albernaz as modifying the Blockburger test in con-
spiracy and other complex cases by including an additional
requirement that the two statutes be directed toward a differ-
ent objective.' This interpretation of Albernaz is questionable.
The Blockburger test need not be modified unless, after first
applying it, the two offenses are found to be the same. More
importantly, the Blockburger test, whether modified or not, is
not an ideal test in complex cases because of the potential for
prosecutorial abuse.
The Blockburger test also creates difficulties in determin-
ing what is the same offense in successive § 1962 prosecutions.
The Blockburger test, especially as applied in the abstract to
statutory elements, is unsatisfactory because a prosecutor may
easily create different elements by carefully drafting the sec-
90. Id.
91. United States v. Dean, 647 F.2d 779, 788 (8th Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds
en banc, 667 F.2d 729 (8th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 456 U.S. 1006 (1982).
92. 450 U.S. 333 (1981).
93. Id. at 343-44.
94. Barry Tarlow, RICO: The New Darling in the Prosecutor's Nursery, 49
FORDHAM L. REV. 165, 258 (1980) (discussing Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49
(1942)).
95. 761 F.2d 1459, reh'g denied, 766 F.2d 1493 (11th Cir. 1985), cert denied sub
nom. Harrell et al. v. United States, 474 U.S. 1100-01 (1986).
96. Id. at 1467.
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ond indictment. Some federal courts of appeal have reasoned
that double jeopardy is not invoked unless both the "enter-
prise" and "pattern of racketeering activity" are the same in
both indictments.' That determination is more accurately
made by applying the totality of circumstances test, and thus
the potential for prosecutorial abuse is greatly diminished.
C Conspiracy
RICO conspiracy prosecutions also present potential for
prosecutorial abuse. Certain issues are unique to conspiracy
cases, such as a RICO § 1962(d) conspiracy. Conspiracy to com-
mit a crime has long been held to be a separate offense from
the substantive offense that is its goal.98 Thus, separate convic-
tion and punishment for both conspiracy and its substantive
crime are permitted without offending double jeopardy."
Application of the Blockburger test to a conspiracy and the
substantive offense that is its goal confirms that they are sepa-
rate offenses. Conspiracy requires proof of a fact (intent to
conspire) that the substantive act does not, and the substantive
act requires proof of a fact (commission of a crime) that the
conspiracy does not.
However, common law has recognized an exception to this
view that conspiracy is a separate offense from the substantive
offense. Under Wharton's Rule,"° the conspiracy merges into
the substantive offense if the substantive offense necessarily
requires the participation of two persons for its commission.
The classic examples are adultery, incest, bigamy,1 1 and duel-
ling.' °2 Wharton's Rule, like the Blockburger test, is only a
rule of statutory interpretation and is applied in the absence of
contrary legislative intent.0
97. United States v. Russotti, 717 F.2d 27, 33 (2d Cir. 1983), cert denied sub nom.
Picarreto v. United States, 465 U.S. 1022 (1984), cert denied sub nom. Marino v. United
States, 465 U.S. 1022 (1984).
98. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 644 (1946), reh'g denied, 329 U.S. 818
(1946).
99. Id.
100. "An agreement by two persons to commit a particular crime cannot be
prosecuted as a conspiracy when the crime is of such a nature as to necessarily require
the participation of two persons for its commission." Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S.
770, 773-74 n.5 (1974) (quoting 1 R. ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE § 589, 191 (1957)).
101. Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 773-76 (1975).
102. Id. at 781.
103. Id. at 786.
1991]
20 University of Puget Sound Law Review
RICO defendants have yet to invoke successfully Whar-
ton's Rule. In United States v. Rone, °4 the Ninth Circuit
refused to apply Wharton's Rule when two defendants sought
to bar conviction on both § 1962(c) substantive and § 1962(d)
conspiracy counts." 5 The defendants argued the § 1962(c)
enterprise consisted of the two defendants associated together
to engage in illegal activity, and thus the offense merged under
1962(d). The Ninth Circuit held Wharton's Rule inapplicable
because (1) the legislative intent of RICO was to the contrary,
and (2) only one person is required in the abstract to violate
§ 1962(c). l °  Conversely, on essentially identical facts in
United States v. Sutton,0 7 the Sixth Circuit held that while
separate convictions are appropriate if the proofs as to the
§ 1962(c) and § 1962(d) counts are identical, merger exists for
the purpose of sentencing. 0 This position stands alone among
the Circuits and has been rejected by the Fourth Circuit'" and
by the Eleventh Circuit, which relied on the plain application
of the Blockburger test. 10 From a logical standpoint, double
jeopardy should bar separate convictions under Wharton's
Rule. If double jeopardy does not apply, then cumulative pun-
ishments are permissible because of legislative intent.
The Sixth Circuit position is still unsettled, however, as
evidenced by United States v. Callahan."' In that case, the
court applied the Blockburger test to conspiracy and substan-
tive charges under RICO and held that the two charges
required different proofs." 2  Therefore, no merger was
required for the purpose of sentencing, and concurrent
sentences were appropriate." 3  The court also considered the
legislative history and congressional intent, concluding that
104. 598 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1979), cert denied sub noam. Little v. United States, 445
U.S. 946 (1980).
105. Id. at 569-70.
106. Id.; see also United States v. Ohlson, 552 F.2d 1347, 1349 (9th Cir. 1977).
107. 642 F.2d 1001 (6th Cir. 1980) (en banc).
108. United States v. Sutton, 642 F.2d 1001, 1040 (6th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 453
U.S. 912 (1981).
109. United States v. West, 877 F.2d 281, 292 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 377
(1989), cert. denied sub nom. Mills v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 195 (1989), cert denied
sub norn. Thomas v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 1113 (1990).
110. United States v. Watchmaker, 761 F.2d 1459, 1477, reh'g denied, 766 F.2d 1493
(11th Cir. 1985), cert denied sub nom. Harrell et al. v. United States, 474 U.S. 1100
(1986).
111. 810 F.2d 544 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 832 (1987).
112. Id. at 548.
113. Id.
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§§ 1962(c) and 1962(d) were directed at separate evils. This
holding is at odds with the earlier Sixth Circuit case of
Sutton.14
The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Brooklier"5 had no
difficulty in rejecting a double jeopardy challenge to successive
§ 1962(d) and (c) prosecutions when both prosecutions were
predicated on the same extortion. After finding that under
Blockburger these offenses are not the same, the Ninth Circuit
noted that the application of Blockburger to successive prose-
cutions arising out of the same transaction has drawn criticism.
Nonetheless, the court relied on prior Ninth Circuit cases and
concluded that Blockburger is the appropriate test for succes-
sive prosecution double jeopardy challenges, not the same
transaction test.
116
These conflicting decisions among the courts of appeal
reflect the uncertainty and confusion surrounding double jeop-
ardy analysis in a complex statutory scheme such as RICO.
Moreover, this confusion also extends to other compound com-
plex statutes.
D. RICO and CCE
The RICO and the Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE)
statutes are both complex statutes, similar in language and
intent. Because of this similarity, the double jeopardy analysis
utilized in CCE cases may be predictive of how courts will ana-
lyze RICO cases. Of course, important differences between
these statutes do exist and should be noted. Nonetheless,
because of the potential overlap of RICO and CCE, prosecutors
are able to charge under both statutes together in ways that
should invoke double jeopardy concerns.
In drug cases, prosecutors utilize not only RICO but also
the CCE statutes (§ 848)." Under § 848, engaging in a CCE is
a crime.11 A person engages in a CCE if any one of certain
proscribed felonies are committed as part of a continuing
series of violations. The statute requires that the defendant be
a manager, organizer, or supervisor of the enterprise and that
114. United States v. Sutton, 642 F.2d 1001, 1040 (6th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert.
denied sub nom. Elkins v. United States, 453 U.S. 912 (1981) (where proofs for the
1962(c) and 1962(d) claims are identical, sentences must be concurrent).
115. 637 F.2d 620 (9th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 450 U.S. 980 (1981).
116. Id. at 622-24.
117. 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988).
118. 21 U.S.C. § 848(a) (1988).
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he act in concert with a minimum of five other persons. The
defendant must also derive substantial income from the
enterprise." 9
Prosecutors may charge the defendant under the corre-
sponding conspiracy statute (§ 846), which makes it a crime to
conspire to commit a CCE.'2° Under the doctrine of double
jeopardy, a § 846 conspiracy conviction should bar a subsequent
prosecution under § 1962(d) arising out of the same facts, pro-
vided that the Blockburger test is satisfied.' 12 Unlike the
RICO statute, a § 846 conspiracy is an included offense of a
§ 848 offense for purposes of double jeopardy because § 848
requires proof of every element necessary to show a violation
under § 846, as well as proof of several additional elements. 22
Thus, clearly § 848 is itself a conspiracy statute, unlike
§§ 1962(a), (b), and (c). Congress did not intend to impose
cumulative punishment under both § 846 and § 848,123 unlike
RICO §§ 1962(c) and (d).'24 However, a prosecutor can still
achieve multiple convictions by charging under both § 848 and
§ 1962(d) because, unlike § 846 and § 848, neither offense is
necessarily included in the other. In this manner, a prosecutor
achieves what he cannot achieve by charging under both § 846
and § 848.
Defendants have not successfully challenged prosecutions
under both § 848 and § 1962(d) under the doctrine of double
jeopardy. Several circuits have determined that a RICO viola-
tion is not the same offense as a CCE violation, and therefore,
the prohibition against double jeopardy does not apply.2 5
119. The continuing series of violations must be: "(A) ... undertaken by such
person in concert with five or more other persons with respect to whom such person
occupies a position of organizer, a supervisory position, or any other position of
management, and (B) from which such person obtains substantial income or
resources." 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(2) (1988).
120. Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 147-50 (1977), reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 880
(1977). See also Philip H. Cherney, Thrice in Jeopardy: The CCE Prosecution of Felix
Mitchell, 27 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 515 (1987).
121. Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 150.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 157.
124. § 1962(a), (b), and (c) are not conspiracy offenses, but substantive offenses.
§ 1962(d) expressly creates a separate conspiracy offense.
125. United States v. Sinito, 723 F.2d 1250, 1259-62 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 817 (1984); accord, United States v. Love, 767 F.2d 1052, 1061 (4th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1081 (1986), cert denied sub nom. Lee v. United States, 474 U.S. 1081
(1986); United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1013-14 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub
non Meinster v. United States, 457 U.S. 1136 (1982), cert denied sub nom. Myers v.
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The Sixth Circuit in United States v. Sinito26 closely com-
pared the RICO and CCE conspiracy statutes. The Sinito
court noted that § 1962(d) violation must establish, "(1) the
existence of an enterprise which affects interstate or foreign
commerce; (2) that the defendant associated with the enter-
prise; (3) that the defendant participated in the conduct of the
enterprise's affairs; and (4) that the participation was through
a pattern of racketeering activity."'" Additionally, the con-
spiracy provision requires that the government establish the
existence of an illicit agreement to violate § 1962(a), (b), or (c)
substantive RICO.
128
According to Sinito, the gravamen of the conspiracy
charge is that each member of the conspiracy agreed to partici-
pate in the affairs of the enterprise by committing two or more
predicate acts, which constitute the "racketeering activity."'"
If the underlying predicate acts are connected to the affairs of
the enterprise, they need not be interrelated.' 30 Moreover, a
defendant may participate in the enterprise by committing var-
ious unrelated crimes as long as the crimes are intended to fur-
ther the enterprise's affairs.
13
The Sinito court then compared the requirements of a
CCE § 848 violation. Under a CCE, the government must show
that the defendant, "(1) engaged in a continuing series of fed-
eral drug felony violations, (2) that were undertaken in con-
cert with five or more persons, (3) with respect to whom he
occupied a position of organizer, supervisor or some other man-
agerial status, and (4) from which defendant had obtained sub-
stantial income or resources.'
132 .
The continuing series element is satisfied with evidence of
three or more related narcotics violations. Section 848, how-
ever, differs from typical conspiracy statutes because it also
requires proof of substantive violations rather than an inchoate
offense.'33
The relationship requirement in a § 848 violation is flexi-
United States, 457 U.S. 1136 (1982), cert denied sub nomn Platshorn v. United States,
459 U.S. 906 (1982).
126. Sinito, 723 F.2d at 1250.
127. Id. at 1260.
128. Id.
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ble. The defendant's relationship to the five other individuals
may be separate and individual, and need not exist at the same
moment in time. Nor must the five persons act at the same
time. 3 4
Thus, as the Sinito court points out, the following differ-
ences between the conspiracy provisions of RICO and CCE are
clear: RICO § 1962(d) encompasses any pattern of racketeer-
ing activity proscribed by § 1961 while CCE § 848 is limited
solely to narcotics trafficking.13' RICO does not require any
minimum number of participants while CCE expressly
requires the involvement of at least five individuals. 3  Also,
RICO does not target any specific level of organized crime fig-
ure.1s7 In fact, RICO encompasses both criminal enterprises
and legitimate businesses that conduct a pattern of racketeer-
ing activity. 35 In contrast, § 848 more narrowly targets the
upper level crime figures of the narcotics "netherworld."'' 3
Note that the existence of a RICO "enterprise" is not a
required element of § 848. Section 848 does not require that
the objective of the CCE be to further the group. The commis-
sion of the series of violations in and of themselves is suffi-
cient. Thus, a § 846 conspiracy has been held to be a separate
offense from (1) a § 1962(d) conspiracy arising out of the same
series of transactions"4 and (2) a 21 U.S.C. § 963141 conspiracy
to import illegal drugs likewise arising out of the same series
of transactions.14
134. Id. at 1260-61.
135. Id. at 1261.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1262.
139. Id.
140. United States v. Boldin, 772 F.2d 719, 727 (11th Cir.), modfied on reh'g, 779
F.2d 618 (11th Cir. 1985), cert denied sub nome. Crump v. United States, 475 U.S. 1048
(1986), cert denied sub norm. Scarborough v. United States, 475 U.S. 1098 (1986), cert
denied sub non. Luck v. United States, 475 U.S. 1110 (1986); United States v. Smith,
574 F.2d 308 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 931 (1978); United States v. Rosenthal, 793
F.2d 1214, 1234-35 (11th Cir.), modfied, 801 F.2d 378 (11th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 480
U.S. 919 (1987), cert denied sub no. Stewart v. United States, 480 U.S. 919 (1987),
cert denied sub nom. Gusher v. United States, 480 U.S. 919 (1987); United States v.
Smith, 574 F.2d 308, 310-11 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 931 (1978).
141. 21 U.S.C. § 963 (1988) makes a conspiracy or attempt to violate any offense
defined in Title 21 a separate offense.
142. United States v. Boldin, 772 F.2d 719, 726-28 (11th Cir.), modified on reh'g,
779 F.2d 618 (11th Cir. 1985), cert denied sub norm. Crump v. United States, 475 U.S.
1048 (1986), cert denied sub norm. Scarborough v. United States, 475 U.S. 1098 (1986),
cert denied sub nom. Luck v. United States, 475 U.S. 1110 (1986); United States v.
Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214, 1234-35 (11th Cir.), modifed, 801 F.2d 378 (11th Cir. 1986).
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These court decisions interpret the functions of RICO and
CCE differently, yet the two statutory schemes still overlap
sufficiently to raise double jeopardy concerns. Conceivably, a
defendant could be prosecuted for the same behavior under
both statutes and then subjected to multiple convictions and
punishments. As a consequence, the potential for prosecutorial
abuse increases, and defendants are confronted with the ero-
sion of double jeopardy protection.
VI. DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND LEGISLATIVE INTENT
The courts have repeatedly found that Congress clearly
intended multiple convictions and punishment for criminal vio-
lations of RICO.'43 Such congressional intent clearly affects
the constitutional protection against double jeopardy, as inter-
preted in recent Supreme Court decisions. The Supreme Court
is split on this point.
As previously discussed, the Supreme Court in Whalen v.
United States'" held that in order to determine whether a
court has imposed unconstitutionally multiple punishments,
the court must first look at what punishments the legislature
authorized."4 In an opinion by Justice Stewart, the Court
expressly noted that this legislative power to define punish-
ments has constitutional limitations.'4 Therefore, the Whalen
court was implicitly resolving only the issue of when a court
has overstepped its constitutional limits in imposing multiple
punishments. The Court left open the additional issue of when
a legislature has overstepped its constitutional limits in impos-
ing multiple punishments.
The Court next addressed the issue of legislative intent
and double jeopardy in Albernaz v. United States. 4 In that
case, the Supreme Court upheld multiple convictions and pun-
ishment for one count of conspiracy to import marijuana and
one count of conspiracy to distribute marijuana despite the
existence of only one conspiracy agreement. The Court
applied the Blockburger test and found no double jeopardy
143. See supra notes 64-65.
144. 445 U.S. 683 (1980).
145. Id. at 688.
146. The court cited as authority for this proposition Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
Whalen, 445 U.S. at 689 n.3.
147. 450 U.S. 333 (1981).
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because each conspiracy statute required proof of a fact that
the other did not. 40 The majority held that the Blockburger
test is not a constitutional measure of double jeopardy protec-
tion but rather a rule of statutory construction with inherent
limitations.'49 Therefore, if two crimes require different ele-
ments of proof, legislative intent to impose multiple punish-
ment is inferred.' 5
The Court went on to discuss the question of when the leg-
islature may constitutionally authorize multiple punishments.
The Court concluded that ". . . the question of what punish-
ments are constitutionally permissible is not different from the
question of what punishments the legislative branch intended
to be imposed."' In other words, if Congress wishes to define
multiple punishments, the imposition of multiple consecutive
sentences for the same offense does not violate the Constitu-
tion. As a result, the legislature's power to define punishment
is no longer constrained by any constitutional limits. Con-
gress is free to define what is constitutionally permissible.
Speaking for three concurring justices, Justice Stewart
challenged the reasoning of the majority. The concurring jus-
tices argued that "these statements are supported by neither
precedent nor reasoning and are unnecessary to reach the
Court's conclusion. '"152 Justice Stewart noted that constitu-
tional limitations on Congressional power did exist and that
Congress could not constitutionally provide for multiple pun-
ishments unless, under Blockburger, each statutory offense
required proof of a fact that the other did not.1  For these jus-
tices, the Blockburger test remained a constitutional test.
Subsequently, in Missouri v. Hunter," the Supreme
Court examined legislative intent to find no double jeopardy
violation. The state legislature had passed legislation making
punishment for two offenses arising out of one criminal act
cumulative, despite the fact that one offense was included in
the other under the Blockburger test."5 The Supreme Court
148. Id. at 339.
149. Id. at 340.
150. Id. at 341-43.
151. Id. at 344.
152. Id. at 345 (Stewart, J., concurring) (Justices Marshall and Stevens joining).
153. I. at 345.
154. 459 U.S. 359 (1983).
155. The Missouri statute provided that a person convicted of 1st degree armed
robbery with a deadly weapon was subject to imprisonment for five years. Another
Missouri statute provided that a person convicted of committing a felony with a deadly
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held that where the legislature clearly intends the same con-
duct to constitute two offenses, one of which is included in the
other and is thus the same offense (applying the Blockburger
test), both offenses may be cumulatively punished.1 Under
this decision, double jeopardy does not bar multiple convictions
and punishments in a single trial. 57 The court did not address
the issue of double jeopardy in successive prosecutions.
The dissent of Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Stevens,
challenged the majority view that the Double Jeopardy Clause
imposes no restriction on the legislature's power to authorize
multiple convictions and punishments." Justice Marshall
stressed the fact that if a legislature has no double jeopardy
restrictions, the number of possible convictions based upon the
same act, state of mind, and result could be unlimited. 59 Jus-
tice Marshall noted that "... the Double Jeopardy Clause lim-
its the power of all branches of government, including the
legislature."''1 The dissenters were rightfully concerned with
the leap the majority made from approving multiple punish-
ments to approving multiple convictions. To the dissenters, the
prohibition against multiple convictions is at the heart of the
constitutional protection that double jeopardy provides.
This march of the Supreme Court toward limiting the pro-
tection of the Double Jeopardy Clause continued with Garrett
v. United States.'61 In Garrett, the defendant challenged his
CCE convictions on grounds of double jeopardy. According to
the defendant, his federal Washington State conviction for the
importation of marijuana barred his subsequent federal Florida
conviction of a CCE count under § 848 because the Washington
conviction was a predicate act of the Florida CCE charge. 62
The Supreme Court noted that this case presented two
prongs of the double jeopardy protection: (1) protection
weapon is additionally guilty of "armed criminal action" and subject to imprisonment
for three years. Id. at 361-62.
156. Id. at 368.
157. Id. at 368-69. Where such legislative intent was lacking, however, the
Supreme Court reached a contrary result. United States v. Simpson, 435 U.S. 6, 12-16
(1978).
158. Hunter, 459 U.S. at 369 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 371 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 374 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
161. 471 U.S. 773 (1985). See also Richard Finacom, Comment, Successive
Prosecutions and the Continuing Criminal Enterprise: The Double Jeopardy Analysis
in Garrett v. United States, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 785 (1986).
162. Garrett, 471 U.S. at 775.
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against a second prosecution following conviction and (2) pro-
tection against multiple punishments.'3 The Supreme Court
relied on a rule from a 1927 case quoted in Blockburger that
stated, "There is nothing in the Constitution which prevents
Congress from punishing separately each step leading to the
consummation of a transaction which has power to prohibit
and punishing also the completed transaction."'164
The Court determined that Congress clearly intended to
create the CCE offense separate from its predicate act
offenses."a The Court went on to say that "[t]he critical
inquiry is whether a CCE offense is considered the 'same
offense' as one or more of its predicate offenses within the
meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause."'16 The Court noted
that the CCE offense is not, in the literal sense, the "same"
offense as one of its predicates.'67
The Court then examined the particular facts of Garrett 16'
and concluded that they differed substantially from the classic
relation of the lesser included offense to the greater offense
presented in Brown v. Ohio.6 9 In Brown, the defendant stole a
car and used it over a nine day period. The Supreme Court
held that Brown's conviction for both the theft of the car on
one day of the nine day period and joyriding on another day
during that period violated double jeopardy because the joyrid-
ing was an included offense of the car theft. 7 °
Garrett's charges in the Florida indictment, when com-
pared with his charges in the Washington indictment, did not
lend itself to the simple analogy of a single course of conduct
such as the felony car theft charged in Brown, which included
the lesser misdemeanor offense of joyriding. 7 ' Furthermore,
the Florida continuing criminal enterprise continued past the
date of Garrett's Washington conviction. Therefore, the Court
found the CCE to be a different offense for the purposes of
double jeopardy.172 The Court proceeded to find congressional
intent for cumulative sentencing, thereby disposing of all of
163. Id. at 777.
164. Id. at 779 (quoting Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1, 11 (1927)).
165. Id. at 779.
166. Id. at 786.
167. Id. at 787.
168. Id. at 787-88.
169. 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
170. Id. at 168.
171. Garrett, 471 U.S. at 788-89.
172. Id. at 791-93.
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the defendant's claims. 173 Justices Stevens, Brennan, and Mar-
shall dissented on the ground that under Brown, the predicate
offense was the same as the CCE offense for the purposes of
double jeopardy.
174
Given the Supreme Court decision in Garrett and the simi-
larity between CCE and RICO, little doubt existed that the
same rule would be applied by the Supreme Court to § 1962(a),
(b), or c) counts and their predicates. Since Garrett, however,
a recent Supreme Court decision has altered the traditional
Blockburger double jeopardy analysis and expanded double
jeopardy protection for criminal defendants. This new analysis
may finally give protection to RICO defendants against multi-
ple prosecutions and punishments.
VII. GRADY V. CORBIN
The Supreme Court, in a recent double jeopardy case,
Grady v. Corbin,"'5 held that "a subsequent prosecution must
do more than merely survive the Blockburger test" to deter-
mine whether a subsequent prosecution is barred by the
Double Jeopardy Clause.176 The Court held that "the Double
Jeopardy Clause bars any subsequent prosecution in which the
government, if, to establish an essential element of an offense
charged in that prosecution, the government will prove con-
duct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has
already been prosecuted.'
77
In Grady, a motorist killed the driver of another vehicle
and seriously injured the passenger. The motorist pleaded
guilty to traffic tickets charging him with (1) driving while
intoxicated and (2) failing to keep right of the median. Two
months later, a grand jury indicted the motorist for reckless
manslaughter, criminal negligent homicide, and reckless
assault. To prove these charges, the prosecution indicated that
it would prove the conduct for which the motorist was previ-
ously convicted (driving while intoxicated and failing to keep
173. Id. at 793-95.
174. Id. at 803-807 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
175. 110 S. Ct. 2084 (1990).
176. Id. at 2093.
177. Id. at 2093. Apparently this test, which is in addition to the Blockburger test,
only applies to successive prosecutions. See United States v. McKinney, 919 F.2d 405,
417 n.13 (7th Cir. 1990). Additionally, Grady did not disturb the primacy of the
Blockburger test in multiple punishment cases. United States v. Ortiz-Alaron, 917 F.2d
651, 654 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2035 (1991).
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right of the median) to establish essential elements of the
homicide and assault charges. 7 '
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, expressly
adopted the suggestion from Illinois v. Vitale179 ten years ear-
lier ". . that even if two successive prosecutions were not
barred by the Blockburger test, the second prosecution would
be barred if the prosecution sought to establish an essential
element of the second crime by proving the conduct for which
the defendant was convicted in the first prosecution."'"
According to the court, the first step in a double jeopardy
analysis is to apply the Blockburger test to determine if the
offenses have identical statutory elements or if one is a lesser
included offense of the other. If either situation is established,
the subsequent prosecution is barred.'' If neither is estab-
lished, however, one must go to the next step and determine
whether the government is proving the same conduct as in the
first prosecution. This second step is necessary because the
individual needs protection from the prosecution, with all its
resources and power, repeatedly attempting to convict an indi-
vidual for one course of conduct.'8 2 Repeated prosecutions for
one course of conduct allow the prosecution to rehearse its
presentation of proof, thus increasing the risk of erroneous
convictions. Moreover, the defendant has the burden of facing
multiple charges in separate proceedings. The Court con-
cluded that, because of these concerns, it has not relied exclu-
sively in past cases on the Blockburger test to vindicate the
double jeopardy protection against multiple prosecutions." s
The Grady opinion expressly stated that the Blockburger
test is a rule of statutory construction to be used as a guide to
determine whether the legislature has authorized multiple
punishments." 4 The Court emphasized that additional policy
concerns underlie multiple prosecutions, giving rise to the need
for an additional protection beyond Blockburger.'"
The Court recognized that Blockburger's technical compar-
ison of the elements of two offenses does not afford criminal
178. Grady, 110 S. Ct. at 2094.
179. 447 U.S. 410 (1980).
180. Grady, 110 S. Ct. at 2087.
181. Id. at 2090.
182. Id. at 2091.
183. Id. 2091-92.
184. Id. at 2091.
185. Id. at 2091.
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defendants sufficient protection for multiple trials. Therefore,
the limitations of the Blockburger analysis require that subse-
quent prosecutions must survive the second step, which relates
to the critical inquiry of what conduct the state will prove.8'6
The Court noted that the State could have either prosecuted
the motorist for all charges in a single proceeding or in a sec-
ond proceeding for vehicular manslaughter if the proof
involved other conduct for which Corbin had not already been
convicted, such as driving too fast in the heavy rain.8 7 Having
failed to do either, the motorist's second prosecution was
barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The Grady court did not directly address whether this new
double jeopardy test would apply to multiple punishments or
multiple prosecutions in the same proceeding. If Grady is
merely applied to successive prosecutions, however, as opposed
to multiple prosecutions in the same proceeding or multiple
punishments, the standard of double jeopardy will continue to
be eroded. Courts will be left with three different standards to
apply to the three-prong protection'88 supposedly provided by
the Double Jeopardy Clause: (1) the standard for multiple
subsequent prosecutions includes the extra protection of the
Grady "same conduct" test; (2) the standard for multiple pros-
ecutions in the same proceeding remains unclear, even in light
of Grady; and (3) in the case of multiple punishments, the
standard is set by the legislature, which, in effect, no longer
has any constitutional double jeopardy limits on its power to
define punishments.
The courts of appeal have split as to the effect of Grady v.
Corbin in successive RICO or CCE prosecutions. In a CCE
conspiracy case demonstrating a good example of prosecutorial
abuse, the Second Circuit in United States v. Calderone'8 9
applied the Grady "same conduct" test. Application of the test
barred prosecution for a heroin conspiracy where a prior
broader CCE drug (heroin, cocaine, and marijuana) conspiracy
involving the same conduct resulted in an acquittal.19° The
subsequent conspiracy prosecutions had in common four overt
186. Id. at 2093.
187. Id. at 2094.
188. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969). See supra text
accompanying note 44.
189. 917 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1990).
190. The court assumed that application of the Blockburger test alone did not bar
the second prosecution. Id. at 720.
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acts charged in both indictments.191
The Calderone court had to face the issue of whether the
"same conduct" test applies to "compound-complex crimes" of
a continuing nature such as RICO. The court noted that Jus-
tice Rehnquist, in Garrett v. United States, 92 indicated that
different double jeopardy principles might apply to single
occurrence offenses than to continuing conduct offenses. The
court rejected this concern because, unlike Garrett, none of the
conduct alleged in the second prosecution occurred after the
first prosecution. 193 The court was unwilling to apply a less
rigorous double jeopardy analysis "simply because Congress
has defined more complicated crimes."'194
The concurring opinion in Calderone relied on another
post-Grady Second Circuit case, United States v. Russo.'9 5 The
Calderone concurrence noted that the Russo court barred pros-
ecution for an obstruction of justice charge where a prior
RICO conspiracy acquittal was based upon the identical
obstruction of justice.'9 The concurring opinion also noted
that when defining conduct for the application of the "same
conduct" test, the conduct in the subsequent prosecution must
be (1) the entirety of a previously prosecuted offense, (2) the
entirety of an element of a previously prosecuted offense, or
(3) the entirety of a distinct component of such an offense,
such as a RICO predicate act."9 The Tenth Circuit is in accord
that Grady is not limited in application to single act crimes.198
In contrast, the Third Circuit rejected the Second Circuit
approach in United States v. Pungitore.19 The Pungitore court
191. Id. at 725-26. The court rejected the government's argument that it should
look to the agreements alleged rather than to the conduct that constitutes the offenses
because the government's approach would be only an application of the Blockburger
test without going to the second step, the "same conduct" test. Id. at 721-22.
192. 471 U.S. 773 (1985).
193. Calderone, 917 F.2d at 722-23 (Newman, J., concurring).
194. Id. at 723 (Newman, J., concurring).
195. 906 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1990).
196. Calderone, 917 F.2d at 723 (Newman, J., concurring) (relying on United States
v. Russo, 906 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1990), a case in which the government conceded that the
"same conduct" test barred the second prosecution).
197. Calderone, 917 F.2d at 725 (Newman, J., concurring). The court noted that
the element in question with a RICO offense is the pattern of racketeering activity for
which the predicate act forms part of the pattern. Id.
198. United States v. Felix, 926 F.2d 1522, 1527 n.5 (10th Cir. 1991). The court
expressly approved of the Second Circuit view that the "agreement" in a conspiracy is
proved by inference from the defendant's conduct-what they said and did-rather
than by direct evidence of an agreement. Id. at 1528.
199. 910 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990).
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was faced with a §§ 1962(c) and (d) prosecution following an
acquittal in a CCE (§ 848) prosecution involving identical con-
duct in both cases.' The Pungitore court followed Justice
Rehnquist's suggestion in Garrett and held that double jeop-
ardy principles applicable in single course of conduct cases
such as Brown v. Ohio and Grady v. Corbin have no applica-
tion in compound complex statutory proceedings such as RICO
cases.2 1' Further, the Third Circuit reasoned that Grady only
"bars a subsequent prosecution where, to prove an essential
element of the offense charged in that prosecution, the govern-
ment will relitigate conduct amounting to an offense subject to
a previous conviction of the defendant." 2
The Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Link" 3 followed
the Third Circuit. The Link court also adopted the rule that
Grady does not apply to successive prosecutions involving com-
pound-complex cases. In that case, the second prosecution was
for a RICO charge using as the requisite predicate acts crimes
for which the defendant had been convicted in a previous
prosecution. °4
The Eleventh Circuit expressly rejected in United States v.
Gonzalez205 the rule adopted by the Second Circuit, holding
that Grady is limited to single act crimes. The court further
held that in a RICO conspiracy prosecution, the conduct in
question is the defendant's agreement, while for a predicate act
the conduct is the defendant's role in the crime. Consequently,
the "same conduct" test is not met." e The court rejected the
Second Circuit view that in most conspiracy cases the "agree-
ment" and the "conduct" are all but synonymous.' °
The Third Circuit view that Garrett limits the Grady
"same conduct" test to single act crimes amounts to an invita-
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1110-11. While recognizing that successive prosecutions may work a
hardship on a defendant, the court held that such prosecutions do not violate due
process in the absence of the defendant affirmatively establishing vindictiveness on the
part of the prosecution. Id. at 1111-12.
202. Id. at 1114 (emphasis added). The court also noted that successive
prosecutions are not barred where the only common element of the two prosecutions
is the enterprise because the enterprise, in itself, is not conduct constituting an offense
for which the defendant already has been prosecuted. Id.
203. 921 F.2d 1523 (11th Cir. 1991), cert denied sub non D'Amico v. United
States, 111 S. Ct. 2273 (1991).
204. Id. at 1529-30.
205. 921 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir. 1991).
206. Id. at 1538.
207. Id.
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tion to prosecutors to charge compound-complex crimes when-
ever possible and then bring successive prosecutions until a
conviction is obtained. The prohibition against double jeopardy
is intended to prevent the evil of successive prosecutions for
the same offense, yet the Third Circuit rule sanctions just such
prosecutions.208
Of course, if a court finds that Congress intended succes-
sive prosecutions to be utilized in RICO and CCE cases, then
such prosecutions could be justified by the Supreme Court's
adherence in Grady to the rule that legislative intent can over-
ride the Double Jeopardy Clause.2" And if the prohibitions
against double jeopardy no longer impose any constitutional
limitations on legislative power as recent Supreme Court opin-
ions suggest, what will prevent the legislature from abolishing
double jeopardy prohibitions in successive single act crime
prosecutions?
VIII. CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis clearly indicates that the Double
Jeopardy Clause affords little protection to RICO defendants
and that the common law doctrine of merger gives even less
protection. Whether Grady will afford meaningful protection
against successive prosecutions for the RICO defendant is yet
to be determined. The Supreme Court has permitted Congress
and the states to override the Double Jeopardy Clause where
the legislature has found what the Court perceives as a legiti-
mate goal and the legislature expressly so states. One has diffi-
208. Where other predicate acts have not yet occurred so that prosecuting the
more serious charges is impossible (RICO), double jeopardy does not bar the
subsequent prosecution. United States v. Scarpa, 913 F.2d 993, 1013-14 (2d Cir. 1990);
United States v. Gambino, 920 F.2d 1108, 1112-13 (2d Cir. 1990). Does this mean that
the opposite is true: that a prosecution for a predicate act may follow a prior RICO
prosecution? Extraordinarily, the Third Circuit stated that Grady would not bar such
a prosecution. United States v. Esposito, 912 F.2d 60, 62-67 (3d Cir. 1990), reh'g denied,
No. 89-5971, U.S. App. LEXIS 23197 (3d Cir. 1990), cert dismissed, 112 L.Ed.2d (1991).
This view cannot be reconciled with Grady.
209. Grady v. Corbin, 110 S. Ct. 2084, 2091 (1990). However, such a view seems
questionable in light of the Grady court's concern that successive prosecutions "raise
concerns that extend beyond merely the possibility of an enhanced sentence," such as,
subjecting the accused to embarrassment, expos6, ordeal, anxiety, and insecurity while
permitting the government the opportunity to rehearse its case, thus increasing the
risk of an erroneous conviction. Id. at 2091-92. The Grady court appears to limit the
legislative override to multiple punishments only. The Court seems to shift to a
different analysis when discussing multiple prosecutions. Id. at 2091. It remains to be
seen if legislative intent is allowed to override these serious concerns.
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culty believing that the drafters of the Bill of Rights intended
that this important protection should be subject to what is, in
effect, a legislative override. The Grady decision, however,
seems to acknowledge the inadequate double jeopardy protec-
tion provided under previous law and may finally afford consti-
tutional protection for RICO defendants against successive
prosecutions. In light of the strong policy concerns underlying
the Double Jeopardy Clause, the application of Grady to RICO
prosecutions and other complex statutory schemes is necessary
to protect the constitutional rights of all defendants.
